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Abstract. We study the dynamics of order flows around large intraday price changes using
ultra-high-frequency data from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We find a significant reversal
of price for both intraday price decreases and increases with a permanent price impact. The
volatility, the volume of different types of orders, the bid-ask spread, and the volume imbalance
increase before the extreme events and decay slowly as a power law, which forms a well-
established peak. The volume of buy market orders increases faster and the corresponding
peak appears earlier than for sell market orders around positive events, while the volume
peak of sell market orders leads buy market orders in the magnitude and time around negative
events. When orders are divided into four groups according to their aggressiveness, we find
that the behaviors of order volume and order number are similar, except for buy limit orders
and canceled orders that the peak of order number postpones two minutes later after the peak
of order volume, implying that investors placing large orders are more informed and play
a central role in large price fluctuations. We also study the relative rates of different types
of orders and find differences in the dynamics of relative rates between buy orders and sell
orders and between individual investors and institutional investors. There is evidence showing
that institutions behave very differently from individuals and that they have more aggressive
strategies. Combing these findings, we conclude that institutional investors are more informed
and play a more influential role in driving large price fluctuations.
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1. Introduction
The current financial tsunami, which is regarded as the biggest one after the Great Depression,
has attracted much interest not only in the industries but also in the academic community.
The direct trigger of the financial breakdown was the subprime mortgage crisis in the United
States of America, and there are numerous efforts aiming to explain its causes and paths.
From a complex systems point of view, the financial tsunami has nothing special since “the
accumulation of several bubbles and their interplay and mutual reinforcement has led to an
illusion of a ‘perpetual money machine’ allowing financial institutions to extract wealth from
an unsustainable artificial process” [1]. In this framework, unfolding the crisis is related at
least to the speculative bubble of foreign capital inflow to the U.S.A. [2], the “new economy”
ICT bubble [3], the slaving of the U.S.A Federal Reserve to the stock market [4], the real-
estate bubble [5], and the commodity bubbles [6]. These phenomena are identified as bubbles
and crashes [7].
More generally, one of the focal issues of economics is the understanding of the price
formation mechanism. By now much is known about the stylized facts related to the price
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fluctuations (see, e.g., [8, 9]), but we are far from having a clear picture about the origins.
As illustrated by the events mentioned in the previous paragraph, this is a question of general
public interest. It is natural to assume, especially from the physics point of view, that the
behavior around major changes will tell us important related details. As we would like to take
a statistical approach, we have to restrict ourselves to “large changes on small scales”, i.e., to
the question: What happens in the neighborhood of a relatively large change if high resolution
data are considered.
An early work about aftershock market behavior is due to Lillo and Mantegna who
studied the relaxation dynamics of the occurrence of large volatility after volatility shocks, as
a analogue of the Omori law after earthquakes [10]. They investigated 1-minute logarithmic
changes of the S&P 500 index during 100 trading days after the Black Monday and found
that the occurrence of events larger than some threshold exhibits power-law relaxation for
different thresholds [10]. Selc¸uk investigated daily index data from 10 emerging stock
markets (Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore,
Taiwan and Turkey) and observed Omori’s law after two largest crashes in each market [11].
Selc¸uk and Genc¸ay utilized the 5-minute Dow Jones Industrial Average 30 index (DJIA) and
identified the Omori law after October 8, 1998 and January 3, 2001 [12]. In addition, the
power-law relaxation could happen after intermediate shocks, which was confirmed in the
USA markets [13] and in the Chinese markets [14, 15].
Another related topic is to study the relaxation dynamics of financial measures after large
price changes. Sornette and coworkers found that the implied variance of the Standard and
Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) index after the infamous Black Monday (19 October 1987) decays
as a power law decorated with log-periodic oscillations [16]. Zawadowski et al examined
the evolution of price, volatility and the bid-ask spread after extreme 15 min intraday price
changes on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ [17]. They found a
well-established price reversal and the volatility which increases sharply at the event decays
according to a power law with an exponent of about 0.4. Zawadowski et al further showed
that the volume and, in the case of the NYSE the bid-ask spread, which increase sharply
at the event, stay significantly high over days afterwards and the decay of the volatility
follows a power law [18]. To´th et al found similar power-law relaxations after large intraday
price changes in the volatility, the bid-ask spread, the bid-ask imbalance, the number of
queuing limit orders, the activity (number and volume) of limit orders placed and canceled
in the stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) [19]. Very recently, Ponzi et al.
performed an analysis studying possible market strategies around large events [20] and they
found empirically that the bid-ask spread and the mid-price decay very slowly to their normal
values when conditioned to a sudden variation of the spread. These findings show that the
resiliency is slower than the assumed exponential form [21, 22].
So far only mature markets have been studied with the technique of the statistical analysis
of large changes in high resolution data. The aim of the present paper is to study an emergent
market, namely the Chinese stock market from this point of view. We investigate the dynamics
of several financial quantities around large price changes with special emphasis put on the
order volume using a data base of the order book data of 23 stocks from the Shenzhen Stock
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Exchange (SZSE). More interestingly, the ultra-high-frequency data allow us to investigate
the effect of order directions (buy and sell), order aggressiveness (partially filled orders, filled
orders, limit orders and canceled orders as explained in Sec. 2) and investor types (individual
vs. institution) on the volume dynamics around extreme events and the behavior of relative
rates of orders around large price changes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of the data base
we investigated. In Sec. 3, we explain the definition of large prices changes and show that
there is a price reversal after price jumps. Section 4 studies the dynamics of the absolute
return, the volume, the bid-ask spread and the volume imbalance around large price changes.
Sections 5, 6, and 7 investigate respectively the effect of order directions, order aggressiveness
and investor types on the volume dynamics around extreme events and the behavior of relative
rates of orders around large price changes. Section 8 summarizes our findings.
2. Data sets
We use a database recording all orders of submission and cancelation of 23 liquid stocks
traded on the SZSE in the whole year 2003. The market consists of three time periods on each
trading day, namely, the opening call action (9:15 AM to 9:25 AM), the cooling period (9:25
AM to 9:30 AM), and the continuous double auction (9:30 AM to 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM to
3:00 PM). In this paper, we consider only the transactions occurring in the continuous double
auction. The time, price and size of each order is recorded in the data set. In the Chinese stock
market, the size of a buy order is limited to a board lot of 100 shares or an integer multiple
thereof, while a seller can place a sell order with any size. The recorded trade size is in units
of shares rather than board lots. The data set also contains the investor type for each order
indicating whether the investor is an individual or an institution.
Note that only limit orders were allowed to submit in 2003. There are situations that
a limit order is only partially executed since the total outstanding volume of orders waiting
in the opposite order book with the prices no more aggressive than the submitted order is
less than the size of the submitted order. Hence, only a part of shares are executed and the
remaining shares are stored in the limit order book. This order is treated as two orders, one as
a partially filled order and the other as a effective limit order. If the price of a buy (resp. sell)
order is higher (resp. lower) than the best ask (resp. bid) price, the limit order is called an
effective market order or a marketable order. The remaining limit orders are called effective
limit orders. Without loss of clarity, we term these two types of orders as market orders and
limit orders in this work. A market order is either a filled order or a partially filled order.
The tickers of the 23 stocks investigated are the following: 000001 (Shenzhen
Development Bank Co. Ltd), 000002 (China Vanke Co. Ltd), 000009 (China Baoan Group
Co. Ltd), 000012 (CSG holding Co. Ltd), 000016 (Konka Group Co. Ltd), 000021
(Shenzhen Kaifa Technology Co. Ltd), 000024 (China Merchants Property Development Co.
Ltd), 000027 (Shenzhen Energy Investment Co. Ltd), 000063 (ZTE Corporation), 000066
(Great Wall Technology Co. Ltd), 000088 (Shenzhen Yan Tian Port Holdings Co. Ltd),
000089 (Shenzhen Airport Co. Ltd), 000406 (Sinopec Shengli Oil Field Dynamic Group
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Co. Ltd),000429 (Jiangxi Ganyue Expressway Co. Ltd), 000488 (Shandong Chenming Paper
Group Co. Ltd), 000539 (Guangdong Electric Power Development Co. Ltd), 000541 (Foshan
Electrical and Lighting Co. Ltd), 000550 (Jiangling Motors Co. Ltd), 000581 (Weifu High-
Technology Co. Ltd), 000625 (Chongqing Changan Automobile Co. Ltd), 000709 (Tangshan
Iron and Steel Co. Ltd), 000720 (Shandong Luneng Taishan Cable Co. Ltd), and 000778
(Xinxing Ductile Iron Pipes Co. Ltd).
The 23 stocks investigated in this work cover a variety of industry sectors including
financials, real estate, conglomerates, metals & nonmetals, electronics, utilities, IT,
transportation, petrochemicals, paper & printing and manufacturing. Our sample stocks were
part of the 40 constituent stocks included in the Shenshen Stock Exchange Component Index
in 2003 [23]. More information of the data base and the market can be found in other relevant
works [24, 25, 26].
3. Defining large intraday price changes
To study the limit order book dynamics around extreme events, we first have to give an exact
definition of extreme events. We generated a minute-to-minute dataset using mid-price of the
last best bid and ask prices in every minute. In this paper, we continue to use a combined
trigger to find the intraday events, as done in Ref. [17, 18, 19].
1.Absolute filter. This is used to find out the cumulative intraday price changes exceeding
a given threshold value within a certain interval. In this paper, we choose 4% and ∆t = 60
minutes as the threshold value and the length of time windows, respectively. Since the
cumulative return R∆t(t) = [p(t) − p(t − ∆t)]/p(t − ∆t) ≈ ln[p(t)/p(t − ∆t)] = r(t), for small
∆t we use the logarithmic return as an alternative quantity to the price change. However,
some events located this way are just usual trades rather than extreme events because of the
existence of intraday pattern in volatility. Moreover, a 4% change may be an everyday event
for a volatile stock, though this can be a signal of an extreme event for a less volatile stock.
2.Relative filter. We measure the average intraday volatility as another contrast. It means
that the filter searches for intraday cumulative return exceeding 6 times the average volatility
during the same time windows. Here, we utilize the sum of squared returns to define volatility
of a certain time windows [27, 28, 29]
v(t,∆t) =
√
t∑
τ=t−∆t
r2(τ) , (1)
where ∆t is length of time windows and t is the end time of the time windows. This filter
also has a weakness, because this method maybe only finds out the events happened in the
period of low average volatility, but actual price changes are very small so that they are not
true extreme events.
To be able to find out real intraday large events, we combine the two filters together and
consider an event to be extreme if it passes both of them. Furthermore, we omit the first
5 minutes of trading day to get rid of opening effects. In order to investigate the intraday
dynamics after events, we also have to omit the last 60 minutes of each trading day. Having
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found an event for the window size ∆t = 60 minutes, we shrink the window as long as the
event still passes both filters. The time of the event, considered as t = 0, is identified with the
end of the window for the smallest ∆t satisfying these criteria.
With the method above, we find 5450 events in 2003. In order to avoid computing a
major event repeatedly, we only include the first events during a given day for a given stock
in the average for convenience. Then 163 events are eligible, of which 131 events are positive
events, others are negative events. Figure 1 gives average cumulative return for positive events
and negative events, respectively. After averaging, the two curves are shifted respectively
downward and upward so that the cumulative returns at t = 0 are zero. An overreaction of
around 1% is found during the first 10 minutes for both, which is consistent with the results in
Ref. [17], but in our case the peak is sharper. After overreaction, in the case of positive events
the price relaxes to a rather stable value. This is not so for negative events, though it should
be mentioned that the much smaller number of negative events causes stronger fluctuations.
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Figure 1. Cumulative return averaged over 131 price increases ((a) positive events) and 32
price decreases ((b) negative events), respectively. Minute 0 corresponds to the time when
the price changes exceeds the both filters. Peak value happens at minute 0. Overreaction is
obvious.
In the following, we will give some empirical results around the extreme events. Because
eligible negative events are rare, we will place emphasis on the positive events in the following
analysis. When we filter events, we only use the intraday data. However, when we investigate
the dynamics over the events, the evolution is not restricted within one day. Note that all
events will have equal weight in the averaging procedure.
Before aggregating all the positive events, we have removed the usual dynamics from all
investigated quantities. For each quantity X(d, t′), the intraday pattern P(t′) is determined as
the reference, where d identifies trading days and t′ = 1, 2, · · · , 240 is the intraday time. The
intraday pattern is removed from X(d, t′)
x(d, t′) = X(d, t′)/P(t′) (2)
for each trading day d. For each event k, the evolutionary trajectory {xk(t) : t =
−100,−99, · · · ,−1, 0, 1, · · · , 200} is extracted from x(d, t′), which contain 100 minutes before
event k and 200 minutes after event k. If the time distance of the event to the closing time
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is less than 200 minutes, we simply extend the time series to the next trading day, which
is rational since the intraday pattern has been removed [17]. We then obtain the average of
quantity X for a group of events K :
xK (t) = 1
||K||
∑
k∈K
xk(t), t = −100, · · · , 200, (3)
where ||K|| is the number of events in group K . Note that t = 0 corresponds to the time when
the extreme event happens.
4. Dynamics of four basic quantities: absolute return, trading volume, spread and
imbalance
In this section, we investigate the dynamics of four important quantities around positive and
negative events. The first quantity is the 1-min absolute return. The second quantity is the
total volume of market orders in one minute. Note that the volume has been adjusted for stock
splitting. The third quantity is the bid-ask spread defined as the difference of best ask and best
bid at the end of each minute. The fourth quantity is the buy imbalance for positive events
defined as the ratio of total volume Vb of buy market orders to the total volume Vb + Va of
market orders in each minute [30]:
I =
Vb
Vb + Vs
. (4)
The sell imbalance for negative events can be defined in an analogous way. All the events are
partitioned into two groups, that is, 131 positive events and 32 negative events. We stress that
we define the imbalance here for market orders [30], which is different from that in Ref. [19]
where both market orders and limit orders are included.
4.1. Positive events
Figure 2 gives the average evolution of the four quantities around 131 positive events. All the
four plots share the same pattern with a sharp peak and an accumulation before the peak and
a decay after that. The faster decay and very slow accumulation of the imbalance of volume
is very different from the LSE case [19]. For absolute return, volume and imbalance, the pre-
event accumulation is slower than the relaxation. In contrast, the post-event relaxation of the
bid-ask spread is slower than its accumulation. The dynamics of the bid-ask spread in Fig. 2c
is very similar to the cases of NYSE and LSE but different from the NASDAQ case [18, 19].
An intriguing feature is that the imbalance of volume reaches its maximum at tmax = −2,
while the peaks of other three quantities happen at tmax = 0 for absolute return and volume
and tmax = 1 for bid-ask spread respectively. This phenomenon in the imbalance dynamics is
different from the LSE case in which tmax > 0 [19], which might be due to the fact that we
have a different definition of the imbalance.
Another intriguing feature of the buy imbalance dynamics around positive events is that
the maximum of the relative buy imbalance is about 1.70. We found empirically that the
unconditional average of the buy imbalance is 0.47, which is reminiscent of the fact that the
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Figure 2. Dynamics of four variables around 131 positive events: (a) absolute return, (b)
trading volume, (c) bid-ask spread, and (d) buy imbalance. The maximal values of bid-ask
spread and buy imbalance locate at tmax = 1 and tmax = −2, respectively, while other two
quantities have tmax = 0. The vertical lines correspond to t = 0.
Chinese stock market was bear from mid-2001 to 2005 [31]. On average, about 79.9% of the
total volume of executed orders was placed on the buy side in the preceding minute before
extreme positive events. It is natural to assume that there is a monotonic relationship between
the imbalance and the price difference. Accordingly, we observe the same kind of asymmetry
in the shape of the pre- and post-event graphs of these quantities. Note that the difference to
Fig. 3a of [19] comes from the different definitions of the imbalance.
4.2. Negative events
Figure 3 gives the average evolution of the four quantities around 32 negative events. We find
that the four temporal evolutions around negative events are qualitatively the same as those
around positive events. It is not surprising that the curves for negative events have larger
fluctuations than the curves for positive events, since there are much more positive events
recognized from the data. All the four trajectories share the same pattern with a sharp peak
and an accumulation before the peak and a decay after that. For absolute return, volume and
imbalance, the accumulation is slower than the relaxation. Again, the dynamics of the bid-ask
spread in Fig. 2c is similar to the cases of NYSE and LSE but different from the NASDAQ
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case [18, 19]. We observe that the peaks of absolute return, volume and bid-ask spread happen
at tmax = 0. Although the imbalance curve is very noisy, we are still able to identify the peak
at tmax = −7, which is also different from the LSE case where tmax > 0 [19].
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Figure 3. Dynamics of four variables around 32 negative events: (a) absolute return, (b)
trading volume, (c) bid-ask spread, and (d) sell imbalance. The maxima of the quantities are
tmax = 0, except for the imbalance, where the data are too noisy to enable the identification of
a proper maximum. The vertical lines correspond to t = 0.
From Fig. 3d, the maximum sell imbalance around negative evens is about 1.4. In
addition, the unconditional average sell imbalance is I0 = 0.53. It follows that, on average,
about 74% of the total volume of executed orders was placed on the sell side in the preceding
minute before extreme negative events.
4.3. Power-law relaxation
To study the relaxations to the normal value, we plot the excess variables defined as the
difference between the actual value and the value in normal periods,
xex(t) = x(t) − x0 = x(t) − 1, (5)
where the value in normal periods x0 is 1 by definition. Figure 4 illustrates the relaxation of
the excess variables around positive events on log-log scales. All the curves exhibit power-law
behaviors
xex(t) ∼ t−α, (6)
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which has the same form as those for western mature stock markets [17, 18, 19, 20]. The
power-law relaxation is more significant with less fluctuations and longer scaling ranges for
absolute return and volume than for bid-ask spread and volume imbalance.
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Figure 4. Power-law relaxation of excess variables for the absolute mid-price return, the
trading volume, the bid-ask spread and the buy imbalance after positive extreme events on
log-log scales with power-law fits. The relaxation exponents α are 0.50 ± 0.03, 0.47 ± 0.02,
0.60 ± 0.09 and 0.23 ± 0.06, respectively.
The estimates of the α values can be obtained through the linear least-squares regression
of ln x against ln t, and we have αAR = 0.50 ± 0.03 for absolute return, αV = 0.47 ± 0.02
for volume, αBAS = 0.60 ± 0.09 for bid-ask spread, and αImb = 0.23 ± 0.06 for volume
imbalance. Similarly, there are also power-law decay for negative events and we find that
αAR = 0.53±0.02 for absolute return, αV = 0.64±0.08 for volume, αBAS = 0.54±0.11 for bid-
ask spread, while for the volume imbalance the fit is too vague. In both cases of positive and
negative events, the fitting was performed on the range [1, 300] for absolute return, volume,
bid-ask spread and imbalance. All the resulting exponents are listed in Table 1.
The relaxation of absolute return for the SZSE stocks is faster than that for the western
stocks in which the exponent αAR = 0.39 ± 0.01 (negative events) and αAR = 0.34 ± 0.01
(positive events) for NYSE stocks, and αAR = 0.43±0.01 (negative events) and α = 0.44±0.01
(positive) for NASDAQ stocks [17], α = 0.25 ∼ 0.40 for NYSE stocks and α = 0.32 ∼ 0.41
for NASDAQ stocks [18], and α = 0.38 ± 0.01 (all events) for LSE stocks [19]. In addition,
the relaxation exponents of the bid-ask spread of SZSE stocks are also different from that
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Table 1. Relaxation exponents of different variables.
Variable
Exponents
Positive events Negative events
Absolute return 0.50 ± 0.03 0.53 ± 0.02
Volume 0.47 ± 0.02 0.64 ± 0.08
Bid-ask spread 0.60 ± 0.09 0.54 ± 0.11
Volume imbalance 0.23 ± 0.06 –
of LSE stocks where α = 0.38 ± 0.03 [19, 20]. A comparison of the resulting exponents is
illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2. Relaxation exponents of absolute return for different stock markets.
Stock markets
Exponents
Positive events Negative events
SZSE 0.50 ± 0.03 0.53 ± 0.02
NYSE[17] 0.34 ± 0.01 0.39 ± 0.01
NASDAQ[17] 0.44 ± 0.01 0.43 ± 0.01
NYSE[18] 0.25 ∼ 0.40 0.25 ∼ 0.38
NASDAQ[18] 0.35 ∼ 0.41 0.32 ∼ 0.40
LSE[19] – 0.37 ± 0.01
5. Volume dynamics of buy and sell market orders
In this section we investigate the flow dynamics of buy and sell market orders around extreme
events. The intraday pattern is determined for each quantity, which has been removed
according to Eq. (2). The events are divided into two groups, one containing all the 131
positive events and the other including all the 32 negative events. In this section we consider
only the positive events. The behavior around negative ones is similar (with exchanged roles
of buyer and seller initiated orders), though the fluctuations are considerably larger due to the
much smaller number of negtive events.
5.1. Pre-event and post-event dynamics
Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the two quantities. Roughly speaking, the shapes of the
dynamics are similar to that for volume shown in Fig. 2b and Fig. 3b. Also, the two trajectories
around negative events are noisier than positive events. The buy volume around positive
events reaches its maximum at tmax = −1, which is about 20 times its average value in regular
moments. The sell volume around positive events reaches its maximum at tmax = 1, which is
about 12 times its average value in regular moments. The buy volume around negative events
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reaches its maximum at tmax = 0, which is about 8 times its average value in regular moments.
The sell volume around positive events reaches its maximum at tmax = −1, which is about 13
times its average value in regular moments. Around positive events, the volume of buy market
orders are larger than sell market orders, which implies a persistent positive buy imbalance
of volumes driving the price up. These observation is consistent with the positivity of buy
imbalance in Fig. 2d and sell imbalance in Fig. 3d and in agreement with Fig. 1.
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Figure 5. Dynamics of relative volume of buy market orders and sell market orders around
131 positive events. The moment that the volume reaches its maximum is (a) tmax = −1 for
buys around positive events and (b) tmax = 1 for sells around positive events.
Another very interesting feature is the significant difference in the structure of the peaks
for buy orders and sell orders. This can be intuitively explained by a propagation chain of
order flows. Due to an endogenous or exogenous process the price starts to rise. The hope
that the process will lead to a new, higher average value of the stock drives the buyers to place
an increasing number of orders. With a little delay the number of sell market orders also
increases indicating the intention to realize the profit due to the price change. The correlation
between order size and liquidity was verified empirically [32]. Before the peak at t = −1, the
aggregate price impact of buy market orders are greater than sell market orders and the price
increases continually. This trend reverses at time t = 0 when the price impact of buy executed
orders is identical to sell executed orders. After t = 0, the price impact of sell executed orders
dominates and the price drops. The situation around negative events is very similar.
5.2. Power-law relaxation
Figure 6 illustrates the post-event relaxation of the excess volume of buy market orders and
sell market orders around positive events on log-log scales, respectively. All the curves exhibit
power-law behaviors. The scaling ranges span more than two orders of magnitude. The
relaxation exponent is αbuy = 0.55±0.03 for buy market orders and αsell = 0.41±0.02 for sell
market orders around positive events. The fitting was performed on the range [1, 300].
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Figure 6. Power-law relaxation of the excess volume of buy market orders and sell market
orders after positive events on log-log scales. The curves have been shifted vertically for
clarity.
6. Volume dynamics of four types of orders with different aggressiveness
We have shown that order direction (buy or sell) can be used to classify the dynamics
of relative volume of incoming market orders. In this section, we investigate further the
dynamics of different types of orders around extreme events by taking into to account order
aggressiveness. Orders can be classified into different types according to their aggressiveness
[33]. Here, we consider four types of orders on each side of the order flow, that is, partially
filled market orders, filled market orders, limit orders and canceled orders. More rigorously,
“market orders” and “limit orders” should be termed “effective market orders” and “effective
limit orders” [34], since there were no market orders permitted to submit in the SZSE in 2003
[24]. The differentiation of partially filled orders and filled orders is validated due to the fact
that they have very different behavior of price impact [23]
We study the dynamics of volumes of four types of buy orders and sell orders around the
extreme events. Therefore, there are eight quantities. The intraday pattern is determined for
each quantity, which has been removed according to Eq. (2). Again, the events are divided
into two groups, one containing all the 131 positive events and the other including 32 negative
events. In addition, we also study the dynamics of numbers of buy orders and sell orders
around the extreme event. We find that the results are quite similar with minor differences.
Figure 7 illustrates the dynamics of volumes around 131 positive events for the four types
of buy orders and sell orders. Figure 7a shows the results for partially filled market orders. The
volume of buy orders that are partially filled starts to increase about 40 to 50 minutes before
the extreme event and reaches about 22.4 times the normal value at tmax = 0. In contrast,
the volume of sell orders that are partially filled market orders increases relatively slower and
reaches its maximum of 10.3 at tmax = 1. Figure 7b shows the results for filled market orders.
The volume of buy filled orders starts to increase about 50 minutes before the extreme event
and reaches about 19.4 times the normal value at tmax = −1. In contrast, the volume of sell
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filled market orders increases relatively slower and reaches its maximum of 11.3 at tmax = 1.
It is clear that sell market orders lag behind buy market orders and there are much more buy
market orders before t = 0 which push the price up. Figure 7c shows the results for limit
orders. The volume of limit buy orders starts to increase about 50 minutes before the extreme
event and reaches about 16.4 times the normal value at tmax = 0. In contrast, the volume of sell
limit orders increases relatively slower and reaches its maximum of 19.0 at tmax = 2. Figure
7d shows the results for canceled orders. We observe that the evolution behaviors are very
similar to market orders in Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b. The maximum volume is 24.4 at tmax = −1
for canceled buy orders and 19.0 at tmax = 4 for canceled sell orders. This reflects the fact
that buy traders are very eager to execute their orders and more unfilled orders are canceled
in order to submit new buy orders.
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Figure 7. Dynamics of relative volume around 131 positive events for four types of buy orders
and sell orders classified by order aggressiveness: (a) partially filled orders, (b) filled orders,
(c) limit orders, and (d) canceled orders.
The characteristic values (tmax and Vmax) of the peaks in Fig. 7 are listed in Table 3. The
dynamics of numbers of the four order types around 131 positive events are very similar to
that of volumes. However, there are still differences. The characteristic peak values (t′max and
Nmax) are also listed in Table 3. We find that tmax < t′max for filled buy orders and canceled
orders and tmax = t′max for the rest six types of orders. After t = −1, the volume of filled
buy order decreases while the number of filled buy orders still increases. It implies that
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investors (especially individuals) with small orders still rush in the market while investors
(more probably institutions) has left the market.
Table 3. Peak characteristic values of the aggregate evolution trajectory of relative volume
and relative number around 131 positive events for four types of buy orders and sell orders
classified by order aggressiveness. The types of PFO, FO, LO and CO correspond to partially
filled orders, filled orders, limit orders and canceled orders, respectively.
Type
Buy orders Sell orders
tmax Vmax t′max Nmax tmax Vmax t′max Nmax
PFO 0 22.4 0 12.5 1 10.3 1 7.9
FO -1 19.4 1 12.9 1 11.3 1 12.2
LO 0 16.4 0 11.7 2 19.0 2 16.9
CO -1 24.4 0 18.4 4 19.0 4 10.6
Figure 8 shows the relaxation of excess volume after positive events (t = 0) for the
four types of buy and sell orders. All curves exhibit power-law behaviors. The power-law
relaxation exponents are 0.47±0.05 for partially filled buy orders in the scaling range [1, 300],
0.47 ± 0.04 for partially filled sell orders in the scaling range [1, 300], 0.57 ± 0.04 for filled
buy orders in the scaling range [1, 300], 0.41 ± 0.02 for filled sell orders in the scaling range
[1, 300], 0.43±0.03 for buy limit orders in the scaling range [1, 300], 0.63±0.02 for sell limit
orders in the scaling range [2, 300], 0.85 ± 0.09 for canceled buy orders in the scaling range
[1, 300], and 0.58 ± 0.05 for canceled sell orders in the scaling range [4, 300].
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Figure 8. Power-law relaxation of excess volume around 131 positive events for four types
of buy orders and sell orders classified by order aggressiveness: (a) partially filled orders, (b)
filled orders, (c) limit orders, and (d) canceled orders.
The excess order numbers after positive events (t = 0) for the four types of buy and sell
orders decay as power laws. The power-law relaxation exponents are 0.43± 0.02 for partially
filled buy orders in the scaling range [1, 300], 0.46 ± 0.02 for partially filled sell orders in the
scaling range [1, 300], 0.52±0.01 for filled buy orders in the scaling range [1, 300], 0.44±0.01
for filled sell orders in the scaling range [1, 300], 0.30±0.01 for buy limit orders in the scaling
range [1, 300], 0.65 ± 0.01 for sell limit orders in the scaling range [2, 300], 0.53 ± 0.03 for
canceled buy orders in the scaling range [1, 300], and 0.54 ± 0.02 for canceled sell orders in
the scaling range [4, 300].
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7. Individual and institutional investors
7.1. Volume dynamics
We investigate here whether the type of investors (individuals and institutions) has any effect
on the volume dynamics of market orders around extreme price changes. Our data base
contains the identifiers distinguishing the two types of investor. Specifically, we consider buy
market orders and sell market orders by individuals and institutions around positive events
and negative events (see Section 5). In addition, we also consider partially filled buy and sell
orders, filled buy and sell orders, buy and sell limit orders, and canceled buy and sell orders
(see Section 6). Since the findings are very similar, we present only the results for market buy
and sell orders submitted by individuals and institutions around positive events.
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Figure 9. Dynamics of relative volume of marketable orders submitted by individual
and institutional investors around positive events: (a) marketable buy orders submitted by
individuals, (b) marketable sell orders submitted by individuals, (c) marketable buy orders
submitted by institutions, and (d) marketable sell orders submitted by institutions.
The results are shown in Fig. 9. Comparing the volume dynamics of buy (or sell) market
orders from individuals and institutions, it seems that the type of investors has negligible effect
on the dynamics. The volume dynamics of buy (resp. sell) market orders from individuals and
institutions are very similar to that shown in Fig. 5a (resp. Fig. 5b). We observe that tmax = −2
and Vmax = 19.4 for buy market orders submitted by individuals, tmax = −1 and Vmax = 17.5
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for buy market orders submitted by institutions, tmax = 1 and Vmax = 10.4 for sell market
orders submitted by individuals, tmax = 1 and Vmax = 11.9 for buy market orders submitted by
institutions. The values of tmax for individuals and institutions are identical to that shown in
Fig. 5a for buy market orders and Fig. 5b for sell market orders respectively except for buy
market orders from individuals.
7.2. Dynamics of relative rates of market orders, limit orders and cancelations
Following Ref. [19], we study in this section the dynamics of relative rates of different types of
orders (market orders, limit orders and canceled orders) around extreme events. Furthermore,
we distinguish each type of orders by the type of investors. For each type of investors, the
numbers of market orders, limit orders and cancelations submitted in the same minute are
determined and the relative order rates are calculated as the proportions of order numbers.
Figure 10 shows the results for positive events. We do not show the results for negative events
since the conclusion is the same. We find no very strong variations in the different rates around
the large price changes. This finding is qualitatively the same as the LSE stocks [19]. It seems,
however, justified to say that the values of the relative rates are not identical between SZSE
stocks and LSE stocks.
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Figure 10. Dynamics of the relative rates of market orders (circles ◦), limit orders (squares )
and cancelations (triangles △) submitted by (a) individuals and (b) institutions around positive
events. The horizontal lines close to the symbols are the corresponding average rates of the
three types of orders in normal periods.
In Fig. 10, the relative rates around extreme events are compared with those in normal
periods. For individuals, the average relative rates in normal periods for market orders, limit
orders, and canceled orders are 0.26, 0.60, and 0.14, respectively. Before the extreme events at
t = 0, the relative rate of market orders is higher than the normal level, while the relative rates
of limit orders and canceled orders are lower than the normal level. After the extreme events,
the situation is different. The relative rate of limit orders jumps above the normal level right
after the events and then decreases to its previous level before the events in about 15 minutes.
In contrast, the relative rate of market orders drops under its normal level immediately after the
events and then returns to its previous level before the events. The relative rate of canceled
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orders becomes identical to the normal level. For institutions, the average relative rates in
normal periods for market orders, limit orders, and canceled orders are 0.42, 0.49, and 0.09,
respectively. On average, the relative rate of market orders is higher than the normal level,
while the those for the limit orders and canceled orders are lower than the corresponding
normal levels. The abrupt change right after the events are visible but not significant since the
data are very noisy.
There are differences between the behavior of relative rates for SZSE stocks and LSE
stocks. For 12 LSE stocks, there are no strong changes in the rates for true market orders,
true limit orders and canceled orders around large price changes, and their rates fluctuate
around ∼ 0.07, ∼ 0.61 and ∼ 0.32 [19]. This result means that no strategy of the investors
about how they place orders is identified [19]. After accounting for the effective orders, the
relative rates of limit orders, market orders, and cancelations for 14 LSE stocks are 0.16, 0.49
and 0.35 [32]. We see that the cancelation ratio of the LSE stocks is much higher than that of
the SZSE stocks, while the rate of market order is much lower than that of the SZSE stocks.
If we consider only the orders submitted, the ratio of the number of effective market orders
to the total number of limit and market orders are 0.30 and 0.25 for the SZSE stocks and the
LSE stocks, respectively. This observation can be attribute to the facts that the proportion of
institutional investors is much higher in the LSE and that the LSE is a mature market while
the SZSE is an emerging market.
Comparing the results for individual and institutions, we see significant differences.
For individuals, the relative rate of limit orders is about 0.58, much larger than that of
market orders (about 0.30). In contrast, for institutions, the relative rate of market order
(about 0.50) is larger than that of limit orders (about 0.45). In addition, institutions have a
smaller rate of canceled orders than individuals. The difference between the behavior of the
individual and institutional investors is very interesting since it sheds light onto the strategies
of these groups. It may indicate that institutions are more aggressive than individuals thus
institutions play a more important role in causing large price changes. Concerning the relative
rate of market orders after the positive event, a careful scrutiny unveils an increasing trend
for individuals and a noisy decreasing trend for institutions. It means that individuals are
still aggressively submit buy market orders after the peak when the institutions are quitting
gradually. Combining together the fact that the relative rate of market orders is much higher
for institutional investors, we can draw a conclusion that institutions are more informed than
individuals in the Chinese stock markets. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom and
we can conjecture that individuals have worse performs than institutions [35].
7.3. Dynamics of relative rates of buy and sell market orders, limit orders and cancelations
The difference between the behaviors of individuals and institutions is more evident when we
further distinguish buy orders and sell orders. Figure 11a and Fig. 11b illustrate the results
for individuals, while Fig. 11c and Fig. 11d show the results for institutions. We find a strong
buy-sell asymmetry in both types of investors. According to Fig. 11a, the relative rate of
buy market orders submitted by individuals increases continuously before the extreme events
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and then drops sharply below its normal level with a fast recovery above its normal level,
while the relative rate of sell market orders decreases continuously before the extreme events
and recovers soon to its normal level smoothly without a sharp increase above its normal
level. The relative rate of canceled buy orders also increases to reach a high level before the
extreme events and then drops rapidly to its normal level, while the relative rate of canceled
sell orders decreases before the extreme events and increase suddenly to a high value which
is followed by a slow relaxation to its normal level. According to Figure 11b, the two curves
of the relative rates of buy limit orders and sell limit orders are almost symmetric to the mean
of their normal values. The rate of buy limit orders increases before the extreme events and
decreases markedly, which is followed by a slow recovery to its normal level.
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Figure 11. Dynamics of the relative rates of market orders (circles ◦), limit orders (squares
) and cancelations (triangles △) around positive events. Solid symbols denote buy orders,
while open symbols denote sell orders. (a) Relative rates of market orders and canceled orders
submitted by individuals. The average relative rates in normal periods are 0.13 for buy market
orders, 0.12 for sell market orders, 0.07 for canceled buy orders, and 0.07 for canceled sell
orders. (b) Relative rate of limit orders submitted by individuals. The average relative rates in
normal periods are 0.28 and 0.32 for buy and sell limit orders. (c) Relative rate of market orders
and canceled orders submitted by institutions. The average relative rates in normal periods are
0.25 for buy market orders, 0.17 for sell market orders, 0.06 for canceled buy orders, and 0.03
for canceled sell orders. (d) Relative rate of limit orders submitted by institutions. The average
relative rates in normal periods are 0.30 and 0.19 for buy and sell limit orders.
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It turns out that for institutional investors the relative rates of the buy and sell orders
behave in an opposite way such that the difference roughly cancels. This can be observed
for both market and limit orders. On the other hand, though the results are very noisy,
the difference seems somewhat smaller for market orders and significantly smaller for limit
orders. It seems as the individual investors would simply follow the events, while the
institutional ones act according to some strategies. We also find that there are less buy limit
orders canceled by institutions and there are no cancelation of buy orders after all in many
minutes around positive events. All these point towards the stronger aggressiveness of the
institutional investors.
8. Conclusion
We studied the dynamics of order flows around large price changes in 23 Chinese stocks
traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2003. Special emphasis was put on the dynamics
of order volume. We found sound evidence of price reversal after large price changes. In the
case of positive event, the price soars up about 5% in 100 minutes and then drops about 1% in
15 minutes to a constant level. This reversal pattern indicates that the price impact of orders
around positive events is permanent. The situation around negative events is similar except
that the price after large negative events does not seem to relax to a constant level. It should
be noted that due to the much lower number of negative events the results for them are always
much more noisy than for the positive ones.
For the dynamics of volatility (absolute return), volume, bid-ask spread, and volume
imbalance, we found a significant peak around the extreme price changes followed by a slow
relaxation, which can be well fitted by a power law. In most cases, the relaxation exponents
are larger for the SZSE stocks than for the LSE stocks.
We investigated the effect of order direction, order aggressiveness and investor type on
the dynamics of order flows. In each case, we found an increase of order volume followed
by a slow decrease, which forms a peak around the extreme events. The volume peak of
buyer initiated execution orders was found to appear earlier and higher than seller initiated
executed orders around positive events, while the volume peak of seller initiated execution
orders was found to lead buyer initiated execution orders in the magnitude and time around
negative events. When orders are divided into four groups according to their aggressiveness,
the behaviors of partially filled market orders, filled market orders and canceled orders are
qualitatively the same: The volume peak of buy (sell) orders of each type appears earlier and
higher than sell (buy) orders around positive (negative) events. However, the volume peak
of sell (buy) limit orders shows up earlier and higher than buy (sell) orders around positive
(negative) events. No qualitative difference has been observed in the volume dynamics around
extreme events between individuals and institutions.
We also studied the relative rates of different types of orders. We confirmed that the
relative rates of market orders, limit orders and cancelations do not fluctuate much around
extreme events, but there is still a significant difference between individuals and institutions.
In addition, we witnessed differences in the dynamics around extreme events for buy orders
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and sell orders. Interestingly, the behaviors are different when the type of investors is taken
into consideration. Clearly, there is a sharp difference between the strategies of individual and
institutional investors, and institutions are more aggressive and more informed.
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